Delegate or Escalate? The Dangers of Kerberos Delegation

Jared Yeo CISA, CISM, OSCP, CRTE, Crest (CRT)

Disclaimer

The views, thoughts and opinions expressed in this presentation are my own and do not express the views or opinions of my employer, organization, committee or other group of individual.

Do not implement any suggestions without doing your own due diligence and getting organizational buy in. You know your network better than me.

Acknowledgements

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Lee Christensen (@tifkin_) for discovering "the printer bug" and providing a POC github.com/leechristensen/SpoolSample


Kevin Robertson (@NetSPI) for Powermad and research on MachineAccountQuota github.com/Kevin-Robertson/Powermad blog.netspi.com/machineaccountquota-is-useful-sometimes/

Matan Hart (@machosec) for "Delegate to the Top" whitepaper

blackhat.com/docs/asia-17/materials/asia-17-Hart-Delegate-To-The-Top-Abusing-Kerberos-For-Arbitrary-Impersonations-And-RCE.pdf

MIT and Microsoft for Kerberos docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/desktop/secauthn/microsoft-kerberos web.mit.edu/kerberos/ Matt Bush (@3xocyte) Alberto Solino (@agsolino) Danyal Drew (@danyaldrew) Andy Robbins (@_wald0) Sean Metcalf (@PyroTek3) Vincent Le Toux (@mysmartlogon) Many others... Kerberos Authentication What?

Kerberos Authentication What?




Kerberos Authentication In a Nutshell

Kerberos comes down to just this

- A protocol for authentication
- Avoids storing passwords locally or sending them over network (uses tickets)
- Key Distribution Center (KDC) authenticates users
- Ticket Granting Server (TGS) provides service tickets to services
- Services are identified by Service Principal Names (SPN)
- Built on symmetric-key cryptography (service tickets encrypted)

Practical applications

- Single sign on (SSO)
- Delegated authentication




https://www.roguelynn.com/words/explain-like-im-5-kerberos/

https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows-server/security/kerberos/kerberos-authentication-overview

https://digital-forensics.sans.org/blog/2014/11/24/kerberos-in-the-crosshairs-golden-tickets-silver-tickets-mitm-more

Kerberos Authentication Simplified



Alice wants to buy a property at a realtor.

Alice has an appointment with **Bob** the property agent.

1. Alice verifies her identity with Security.

2. Alice gets a Visitor Pass, it contains details of her identity.

Meeting the Property Agent

3. Alice shows her Visitor Pass to the Security, and requests to meet Bob.

4. Security puts Alice's identity in a Blue Envelope that only Bob can open.

5. Alice brings the Blue Envelope to Bob, who opens it, and determines if Alice has an appointment.

Kerberos Authentication Attacks

Kerberos Authentication Attacks

Overpass the Hash

A password or hash is used to create a TGT.

Kerberoasting (T1208)


A service ticket requested and cracked offline.

Pass the Ticket (T1097) Impersonation of users by using their TGTs.

Service tickets are forged and used to access services (Silver Ticket).

TGT's are forged to impersonate any user (Golden Ticket).

https://digital-forensics.sans.org/blog/2014/11/24/kerberos-in-thecrosshairs-golden-tickets-silver-tickets-mitm-more



any and all domain services. Because the service tickets for signed with the long-term key of the target service account, there's an opportunity to crack the target account's key, particularly if the password that created the key is weak. Cracking attempts are much faster with RC4 verus AES. Silver Ticket (Step 5): If an attacker has the long-term key for a service account, they can create a ticket that the service can decrypt and will assume valid. The crafted service ticket can be created for any user with any group membership, including domain admin. This usually works because most services do not take the optional Step 6 to verify the PAC information with the KDC. Kerberos Delegation What? Why?


Kerberos Delegation What? Why?

Often, there were legitimate requirements for a service to impersonate the user to access another service.


To facilitate this requirement, delegation features were introduced to the Kerberos protocol.

E.g. normaluser authenticates with Web Server. The web application requires to retrieve content from a File Server as normaluser.


With Kerberos delegation, the Web Server can use normaluser's credentials to retrieve content from File Server.



Kerberos Delegation What? Why?



Weaponization



- Background
 - Command Line Usage


Q

- Opsec Notes
 - Overview
 - Weaponization

Kerberos Delegation Unconstrained Delegation

TrustedForDelegation

Unconstrained Delegation (TrustedForDelegation)



Bob needs to check Alice's financial history with Finance.



Steps 1 to 5 – Same as before. Bob keeps a copy of Alice's Visitor Pass.



6. Bob tells Security: "I have Alice's Visitor Pass, I need to access her data at Finance"

7. Security puts Alice's identity into a Pink Envelope that only Finance can open, gives it to Bob.

8. **Bob** then brings the **Pink Envelope** to **Finance**, who then opens it, retrieves the finance history of the identity in the envelope (Alice's identity).

Unconstrained Delegation (TrustedForDelegation)

Webserver (Unconstrained Delegation) Fileserver

If the Webserver becomes compromised

Delegation	Delegation Style	Description
Unconstrained	TGT Forwarding	When a user accesses a server with unconstrained delegation enabled, the user sends their TGT to the server. The server can then impersonate the user by using the user's TGT to authenticate to other services in the network.

- Adversary can retrieve and use all stored TGT's (anyone who previously authenticated) kept in Webserver's memory and "Pass The Ticket".
- If the domain admin was coerced to authenticate (send credentials) to **Webserver**, "Pass The Ticket" is possible with the domain admin TGT.
- In Oct 2018, Lee Christensen (@Tifkin_) shared that if the Print Spooler service is running, you can force that computer's credentials to be sent to an Unconstrained Delegation server. (The Printer Bug)
- Print Spooler service is running by default on all Windows Servers (including domain controllers).
- Possible to compromise another DC in another forest as well (CVE2019-0683, patched 9 July 2019.

https://www.slideshare.net/harmj0y/derbycon-the-unintended-risks-of-trusting-active-directory https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/openspecs/windows_protocols/ms-rprn/d42db7d5-f141-4466-8f47-0a4be14e2fc1 https://www.harmj0y.net/blog/redteaming/not-a-security-boundary-breaking-forest-trusts/

Ingredient #3: The Printer Bug

- Old but enabled-by-default-on-Windows Print System Remote Protocol (MS-RPRN)
- RpcRemoteFindFirstPrinterChangeNotification(Ex)
 - Purpose: "REMOTESERVER, send me a notification when _____" (e.g. when there's a new print job)
- Implication: *Any domain user* can coerce REMOTESERVER\$ to authenticate to any machine
 - Won't fix by Microsoft " by design" ©





Kerberos Delegation Demo - Unconstrained Delegation

Unconstrained Delegation Server Compromised = Domain Admin Privileges

(The administrator to a server configured with Unconstrained Delegation is effectively the domain administrator.)




Active Directory Users and Computers	WEBSERVER Properties ? ×	Web Admin Properties ? X
File Action View Help Image: Second system Image: Second system Image: Second system Image: Second system	Location Managed By Object Security Dial-in Attribute Editor General Operating System Member Of Delegation Password Replication Delegation is a security-sensitive operation, which allows services to act on behalf of another user. Delegation Delegation	Security Environment Sessions Remote control Remote Desktop Services Profile COM+ Attribute Editor General Address Account Profile Telephones Organization Published Certificates Member Of Password Replication Dial-in Object
 Saved Queries internal.local Builtin Computers Domain Controllers Domain Controllers ForeignSecurityPrincipals Keys LostAndFound Managed Service Accoun Program Data System Users NTDS Quotas TPM Devices AnsAdmins DonsAdmins DonsUpdate Donain Co Domain Ad Domain Co Domain Co Domain Co Domain Gu Domain Gu Computers Group Polic Guest 	 Do not trust this computer for delegation Trust this computer for delegation to any service (Kerberos only) Trust this computer for delegation to specified services only Use Kerberos only Use any authentication protocol Services to which this account can present delegated credentials: 	Member of: Name Active Directory Domain Services Folder Domain Users internal.local/Users Add Remove
krbtgt Protected U RAS and IAS Read-only I Schema Adu Unprivilege Web Admin	C Expanded Add Remove	Primary group: Domain Users Set Primary Group There is no need to change Primary group unless you have Macintosh clients or POSIX-compliant applications. OK Cancel Apply Help
		Build 17763.rs5_release.180914-1
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Kerberos Delegation Traditional Constrained Delegation (TCD)

S4U2Proxy

Protocol Transition S4U2Self / TrustedToAuthForDelegation


Traditional Constrained Delegation (TCD) S4U2Proxy



Bob no longer allowed to keep Visitor Pass.



Bob is now given the *msDS-AllowedToDelegateTo* property, which lists the other Dept's that he can access on behalf of Alice.



Steps 1 to 5 – Same as before.

6. **Bob** checks his *msDS-AllowedToDelegateTo* property to see if **Finance** is listed as a place where he can get more info on behalf of Alice.

If Finance is listed, Bob brings Alice's Blue Envelope to Security and says "I need to access Alice data at Finance."

7. Security then puts Alice's identity in a Pink Envelope that only Finance can open, gives it to Bob.


8. **Bob** then brings the **Pink Envelope** to **Finance**, who then opens it, retrieves the finance history of the identity (Alice's identity) in the envelope.

Kerberos Delegation Traditional Constrained Delegation (TCD)

S4U2Proxy

Protocol Transition S4U2Self / TrustedToAuthForDelegation

Traditional Constrained Delegation (TCD) Protocol Transition (S4U2Self/TrustedToAuthForDelegation)



Finance (Fileserver) 5. Alice meets **Bob** out of office. **Bob** cannot S4U2Proxy (use her Blue Envelope) to check her finance history with Finance.



6. **Bob** asks **Security** to give **Alice** a **Blue Envelope**. Because **Bob** has TrustedToAuthForDelegation.

7. Security gives Alice a Blue Envelope.

8. **Bob** checks his *msDS-AllowedToDelegateTo* property to see if **Finance** is listed as a place where he can get more info on behalf of Alice.

If Finance is listed, Bob brings Alice's Blue Envelope to Security and says "I need to access Alice data at Finance."

9. Security then puts Alice's identity in a Pink Envelope that only **Finance** can open.

10. **Bob** then brings the **Pink Envelope** to **Finance**, who then opens it, retrieves the finance history of the identity (Alice's identity) in the envelope.

WEBSERVER CAN CREATE SERVICE TICKETS!



<u>Kerberos Delegation</u> Traditional Constrained Delegation (TCD)



So while the **Webserver** has been "constrained" to give access only to the **Fileserver**, there were still risks.

With rights to configure S4U2Self and S4U2Proxy

- Additional SPN's could be added to a user or computer object, e.g. ldap/dc.domain.local (a service on the domain controller could be added)
- A service ticket could then be created for anyone, like Administrator (S4U2Self)
- The "Administrator ticket" can then be used to access ldap/dc.domain.local (S4U2Proxy).

Constrained	Self (S4U2self)	Any accounts (user or computer) that have service principal names (SPNs) set in their msDS-AllowedToDelegateTo property can pretend to be any user in the domain (i.e. they can "delegate") to those specific SPNs.

Microsoft Recognized This Problem


A right called *SeEnableDelegationPrivilege* was needed to modify delegation properties

- TrustedForDelegation
- TrustedToAuthForDelegation
- msDS-AllowedToDelegateTo

Only domain/enterprise admins have this privilege.

Kerberos Delegation Resource Based Delegation

Kerberos Delegation Resource Based Delegation



A new kind of Kerberos constrained delegation addresses shortcomings

Mike Stephens | Feb 22, 2013

Constrained delegation in Server 2012 (aka resource based constrained delegation) introduces the concept of controlling delegation of service tickets using a security descriptor rather than an allow list of SPNs.

This change simplifies delegation by enabling the resource to determine which security principals are allowed to request tickets on behalf of another user.

https://www.itprotoday.com/windows-server/how-windows-server-2012-eases-pain-kerberos-constrained-delegation-parthttps://blog.kloud.com.au/2013/07/11/kerberos-constrained-delegation/

Resource Based Delegation


Delegation	Webserver (Delegation Configured Here)	Fileserver	
Traditional Constrained Delegation (Server 2003)	 <i>msDS-AllowedToDelegateTo</i> property defines services (SPN's) that it can <u>delegate to</u>. S4U2Self only possible only if <i>TrustedToAuthForDelegation</i> is set. Requires domain admin to configure delegation. 	 No visibility of delegation. 	



Delegation	Webserver	Fileserver (Delegation Configured Here)
Resource Based Delegation (Server 2012)	 <i>msDS-AllowedToDelegateTo</i> not used. S4U2Self possible even if <i>TrustedToAuthForDelegation</i> is not set. 	 Delegation configured in Fileserver's msDS- AllowedToActOnBehalfOfOtherIdentity property. User only requires writable Discretionary Access Control List (DACL) permission.



RBCD DELEGATION



Kerberos Delegation DACL (Mis)configurations





An ACE Up the Sleeve

Designing Active Directory DACL Backdoors

Andy Robbins and Will Schroeder SpecterOps

AD objects are secured by control rights

Control Right	Rights over an AD object
GenericAll	Allows all rights, including granting rights
GenericWrite	Modify of almost all properties
WriteDACL	Modify security object descriptor
WriteOwner	Take ownership of an object
Many others	


Rights to a User Object?

- Change password \bullet
- Targeted kerberoasting 0

Rights to a Computer Object?

See plaintext LAPS password \bullet

Name	Туре	Descrip
1 2012R2	Computer	
🜉 LAB15E2K13	Computer	
LAB15SPT	Computer	
LAB15W8	Computer	
MANAGEEN	Computer	
WEBDEV	Computer	



https://wald0.com/?p=112

https://www.blackhat.com/docs/us-17/wednesday/us-17-Robbins-An-ACE-Up-The-Sleeve-Designing-Active-Directory-DACL-Backdoors.pdf

Resource Based Delegation

Delegation	Webserver (Delegation Configured Here)	Fileserver
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RogueSPN ((Front End)	DELEGATION Webserver (Front End) (Back End)	TCD DELEGATION Fileserver (Back End) What if you have a writable DACL here?
Delegation	Webserver	Fileserver (Delegation Configured Here)
Resource Based Delegation (Server 2012)	 <i>msDS-AllowedToDelegateTo</i> not used. S4U2Self possible even if <i>TrustedToAuthForDelegation</i> is not set 	 Delegation configured in Fileserver's msDS- AllowedToActOnBehalfOfOtherIdentity property. User only requires writable Discretionary Access Control List (DACL) permission.

Webserver (Front End) **RBCD DELEGATION**

Fileserver (Back End)

Resource Based Delegation

Delegation	Webserver (Delegation Configured Here)	Fileserver	
Traditional Constrained Delegation (Server 2003) RogueSPN (Front End)	(Front End)	 No visibility of delegation. <i>LEGATION</i> Fileserver (Back End) have a writable DACL here? 	
Delegation 💻 💻	Webserver — — — — —	Fileserver (Delegation Configured Here)	
Resource Based Delegation (Server 2012)	 msDS-AllowedToDelegateTo not used. S4U2Self possible even if TrustedToAuthForDelegation is not set. 	 Delegation configured in Fileserver's msDS- AllowedToActOnBehalfOfOtherIdentity property. User only requires writable Discretionary Access Control List (DACL) permission. 	


 Webserver
 RBCD DELEGATION
 Fileserver

 (Front End)
 (Back End)

Kerberos Delegation Abusing Resource Based Delegation to Compromise TCD Servers

MachineAccountQuota Enabled + Writable TCD DACL = Compromised TCD Server

Abusing Resource Based Delegation to Compromise TCD Servers



MachineAccountQuota (MAQ)

By default - all unprivileged domain users can add up to 10 computers to an Active Directory (AD) domain, and set an SPN for it.

https://blogs.technet.microsoft.com/canitpro/2015/05/26/step-by-step-allowing-or-preventing-domain-users-from-joining-workstations-to-the-domain/ https://support.microsoft.com/en-sg/help/243327/default-limit-to-number-of-workstations-a-user-can-join-to-the-domain

Abusing Resource Based Delegation to Compromise TCD Servers

If adversary can write to the Webserver computer object + MachineAccountQuota enabled

- Adversary could create rogue service (RogueSPN) by abusing MachineAccountQuota.
- Configure Resource Based Delegation on Webserver
- Do **S4U2Self** to get an administrator ticket for **RogueSPN**.
- Do S4U2Proxy using the obtained ticket to gain administrator access to Webserver.

If the domain is compromised

- Persistence: Resource-based constrained delegation can be configured on the DC to produce krbtgt TGTs on-demand.
- Administrator Service Ticket to krbtgt service == Golden ticket.

KD	C/TGS	Rogue SPN (Front End)	Webserver (Back End)
	S4U2Self to CIFS for RogueSPN	RBCI	
	Service Ticket to CIF RogueSPN	S for	
S4U -	S4U2Proxy to CIFS f Webserver	or	
	Service Ticket to CIF for Webserver	S Access to CIFS s Webserver from RogueSPN	

Kerberos Delegation Demo - Abusing Resource Based Delegation to Compromise TCD Servers

MachineAccountQuota Enabled + Writable TCD DACL = Compromised TCD



Active Directory Users and Computers	WEBSERVER Properties	? ×	Unprivileged Properties	? ×
File Action View Help	Location Managed By Object Security Dial- General Operating System Member Of Delegation Delegation is a security-sensitive operation, which allows services to Delegation Delegation	Password Replication		Sessions Remote control COM+ Attribute Editor Profile Telephones Organization
 Active Directory Users and Comp Saved Queries internal.local Builtin Computers Domain Controllers ForeignSecurityPrincipals Keys 	 behalf of another user. Do not trust this computer for delegation Trust this computer for delegation to any service (Kerberos only) Trust this computer for delegation to specified services only Use Kerberos only Use any authentication protocol 		Published Certificates Member Of Password Replication Dial-in Ob Member of:	
 LostAndFound Managed Service Accoun Program Data System Users NTDS Quotas TPM Devices 	time DC I	Is: VTERNA		need to change Primary group unless acintosh clients or POSIX-compliant
< >>	OK Cancel A	ply Help	OK Car	
日 夕 日 谷 同 冬				Build 17763.rs5_release.180914-14

Kerberos Delegation RBCD + NTLM Relay = Local Privilege Escalation (LPE)

Kerberos Delegation Windows 10 LPE

Wagging the Dog: Abusing Resorx

https://shenaniganslabs.io/2019/01/28/Waggin...

Case Study 2: Windows 10/2016/2019 LPE

One late night, Matt Bush (@3xocyte), Danyal Drew (@danyaldrew) and I brainstormed ideas where to find suitable RCE/LPE primitives, and decided to explore what happens when a user changes the account picture in Windows 10/2016/2019. We analysed it with Process Monitor and quickly found that during the account picture change SYSTEM opens the picture file to read its attributes. It is a small and meaningless operation; not an arbitrary file write/read/delete. But we are humble people, and that is all we wanted.

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Windows 10 LPE

द्य Process Monitor - Sysinternals: www.sysinternals.com		
File Edit Event Filter Tools Options Help		
🖻 🔜 💸 🖗 💟 🗟 🙅 💽 🛤 🦻 🧱 🛃 🕰 🌆		
Time o Process Name PID Operation Path 4:30:50 Image: DIIHost.exe 5196 ScreateFile \\roguepc@80\a\peee.jpg	Result Detail SUCCESS Desired Ac	ccess: R
	💐 Event Properties	$ \Box$ \times
Event Process Stack	Event Process Stack	
Date: 23/6/2019 4:30:50.9892033 am	Image	
Thread: 3900 Class: File System	COM Surrogate Microsoft Corporation	
Operation: CreateFile	Name: DllHost.exe	
Result: SUCCESS	Version: 10.0.18362.1 (WinBuild	.160101.0800)
Path: \\roguepc@80\a\peee.jpg	Path:	
Duration: 0.0002614	C:\Windows\system32\DllHost.ex	(e
Desired Access: Read Attributes	Command Line:	
Disposition: Open	C:\Windows\system32\DllHost.ex	ke /Processid:{133EAC4F-5891-4D04-BADA-D848703
Options: Open Reparse Point Attributes: n/a		
ShareMode: Read, Write, Delete	PID: 5196	Architecture: 64-bit
AllocationSize: n/a OpenResult: Superseded	Parent PID: 772	Virtualized: False
	Session ID: 0	Integrity: System
	User: NT AUTHORITY\SYST	TEM
	Auth ID: 0000000:000003e7	
	Started: 23/6/2019 4:30:50 a	m Ended: (Running)

Windows 10 LPE

→ 🕐 🔒 https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows... 🛧

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Advanced Security Settings for PC1

LocalSystem Account

05/31/2018 • 2 minutes to read • Contributors 曼 2 🚳

The LocalSystem account is a predefined local account used by the service control manager. This account is not recognized by the security subsystem, so you cannot specify its name in a call to the <u>LookupAccountName</u> function. It has extensive privileges on the local computer, and acts as the computer on the network. Its token includes the NT AUTHORITY\SYSTEM and BUILTIN\Administrators SIDs; these accounts have access to most system objects. The name of the account in all locales is .\LocalSystem. The name, LocalSystem or *ComputerName*\LocalSystem can also be used. This account does not have a password. If you specify the LocalSystem account in a call to the <u>CreateService</u> or <u>ChangeServiceConfig</u> function, any password information you provide is ignored.

A service that runs in the context of the LocalSystem account inherits the security context of the SCM. The user SID is created from the **SECURITY_LOCAL_SYSTEM_RID** value. The account is not associated with any logged-on user account. This has several implications:

- The registry key HKEY_CURRENT_USER is associated with the default user, not the current user. To access another user's profile, impersonate the user, then access HKEY_CURRENT_USER.
- The service can open the registry key HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\SECURITY.
- The service presents the computer's credentials to remote servers.
- If the service opens a command window and runs a batch file, the user could hit CTRL+C to terminate the batch file and gain access to a command window with LocalSystem permissions.

Owner: Domain Admins (INTERNAL\Doma	in Admins) Change
	in and ge
Permissions Effective Access	
· · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · ·	missions for a user, group, or device account. If the account is a me tial additions to the security token for the account. When you evalu p is a member of must be added separately.
User/ Group: SELF Select a user	
🐋 Read	msDS-AllowedToActOnBehalfOfOtherIdentity
🐋 Write	emsDS-AllowedToActOnBehalfOfOtherIdentity
SMB] NTLMv2-SSP Client : 10.0.0 SMB] NTLMv2-SSP Username : INTERNA	
	NTERNAL:a41bc32e03cd4d80:F7A126E275C7F6481
F939D0CE0279DA:010100000000000000	53150DE09D201933169FCA0C63BDD00000000002000
	4E002D005000520048003400390032005200510041
	E006C006F00630061006C0003003400570049004E0
	.004100460056002E0053004D00420033002E006C00 033002E006C006F00630061006C0007000800C0653
	30000000000000000000000000000000000000
	910A03F095F846EDE8C0A001000000000000000000
000000000000000000000000000000000000000	0073002F006C007500620075006E00740075000000
000000000000000000000000000000000000000	

Kerberos Delegation NTLM Relay (Simplified)



<u>Adversary</u> **Assumptions**


- Able to connect a rogue device to the network.
- Rogue device can communicate with both victim and DC.
- Able to get Victim to send credentials to rogue device

Windo		Webdav Domain
(Vict	im) Relay	Server (Ta
	I need \\rogue\a\pic.jpg I have pic.jpg SYSTEM to reads the image attributes.	
		Captures computer account creds, configures RBCD with LDAP.

Controller get)

Target (DC) <u>Assumptions</u>

LDAP signing disabled.



Kerberos Delegation Demo – Windows 10 LPE



Active Directory Users and Computers		- 🗆 X			
Active Directory Users and Comp Name Type	Lile Action View Help			- [1 × 1
 Saved Queries internal.local Builtin Computers Computers Domain Controllers ForeignSecurityPrincipals Keys LostAndFound Managed Service Account Program Data System Users NTDS Quotas TPM Devices 	 DNS DC Forward Lookup Zones _msdcs.internal.local internal.local Reverse Lookup Zones Trust Points Conditional Forwarders 	Name 	Type Start of Authority (SOA) Name Server (NS) Host (A) Host (A) Host (A) Host (A)	Data [56], dc.internal.local., host dc.internal.local. 10.0.0.1 10.0.0.1 10.0.0.2 10.0.0.3	Timestam; static static 6/16/2019 static 6/16/2019 6/16/2019
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				Windows Server 2019 S Windows License Build 17763.rs5_re	e valid for 180 da
N III 🖉	1				^ 📮

Summary

Delegation	How it Works	Risks	Mitigation
Unconstrained	 Makes and stores a copy of user's TGT for delegation. 	 Stored TGT's can be used for PTT attacks Forced authentication bugs may also facilitate compromise of other hosts within other forests with bidirectional trusts. Existing admin's for unconstrained servers are high value targets; technically already own the domain. 	 Unconstrained delegation should no longer exist (except for domain controllers, which is a default configuration). Disable the Print Spooler service on domain controllers where possible. KB4490425 (July 9 2019) disables TGT delegation across trusts.
			No. BloodHound
Find Servers Co	nfigured with Uncon	strained Delegation	Start typing to search for a node
			Database Info Node Info Queries
•	er -Filter {TrustedForl er {TrustedForDelega	Delegation -eq \$True} ation -eq \$True}	Find all Domain Admins Find Shortest Paths to Domain Admins Find Principals with DCSync Rights Users with Foreign Domain Group Membership

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Groups with Foreign Domain Group Membership

Shortest Paths from Kerberoastable Users

Shortest Paths to Unconstrained Delegation Systems

Map Domain Trusts


https://blogs.technet.microsoft.com/389thoughts/2017/04/18/get-rid-of-accounts-that-use-kerberos-unconstrained-delegation/ https://support.microsoft.com/en-sg/help/4490425/updates-to-tgt-delegation-across-incoming-trusts-in-windows-server https://techcommunity.microsoft.com/t5/Premier-Field-Engineering/Changes-to-Ticket-Granting-Ticket-TGT-Delegation-Across-Trusts/ba-p/440283

Summary

Delegation	How it Works	Risks	Mitigation
Traditional Constrained (S4U2Self, S4U2Proxy)	 Stores list of SPN's in the "front end" in msDS- AllowedToDeleg 	 S4U2Self (if enabled) can be abused to create service tickets for anybody, including administrators, to compromise delegated SPN's. 	 S4U2Self can be detected in a Kerberos service ticket request event (Event ID 4769), where the Account Information and Service Information sections point to the same account.
	ateTo.	 S4U2Proxy can be abused to request for arbitrary services that it was not originally intended to delegate to. 	 S4U2Proxy: can be detected in a Kerberos service ticket request event (Event ID 4769), where the Transited Services attribute in the Additional Information is not blank.
			 Any non-privileged accounts with SeEnableDelegationPrivilege (Can configure constrained delegation)?

Find Servers Configured with Constrained Delegation

Get-ADObject -Filter {msDS-AllowedToDelegateTo -ne "\$null"} -Properties msDS-AllowedToDelegateTo



Summary

Delegation	How it Works	Risks	Mitigation
Resource Based	 Stores in security descriptors in the "back end" in msDS- AllowedToActOn BehalfOfOtherId entity. 	 A server can be compromised if its computer object DACL is writable. Domain Persistence: RBCD on the krbtgt account allows producing TGTs for arbitrary users. Resetting krbtgt twice may not enough. 	 Resource-based constrained delegation configuration changes can be detected in directory service object modification events (Event ID 5136), where the LDAP Display Name is "msDS-AllowedToActOnBehalfOfOtherIdentity". Configure computer objects to deny Self from writing to the attribute msDS-AllowedToActOnBehalfOfOtherIdentity If RBCD not used, block Everyone from writing to the attribute msDS-AllowedToActOnBehalfOfOtherIdentity. Domain Persistence: Detect S4U2Proxy to krbtgt - Event ID 4769 (Kerberos service ticket request event), where the Transited Services attribute in the Additional Information is not blank and the Service Information points to the krbtgt account.

Conclusion

Computer accounts are an attack primitive

Basics First – Defense in depth

 NAC, network segmentation, app whitelisting, SMB Signing, LDAP signing, vulnerability management, patching, hardening, credential management, logging, monitoring, etc.

Detection – Understand what "normal" looks like

- Any raw non-lsass/non-authorized Kerberos port 88 traffic should be considered as suspicious.
- Have visibility over all Kerberos delegations and traffic in the network. S4U2Proxy is a dangerous extension that should be restricted as much as possible.
- Configure privileged accounts to "Account is sensitive and cannot be delegated" or place in "Protected Users"

Forward Looking

- Any other means where coersed authentication can occur?
- Is MachineAccountQuota needed?
- https://msdn.microsoft.com/en-us/library/cc246112.aspx

<u>∧</u> Warning

Accounts for services and computers should never be members of the Protected Users group. This group would provides incomplete protection anyway because the password or certificate is always available on the host. Authentication will fail with the error "the user name or password is incorrect" for any service or computer that is added to the Protected Users group.

Microsoft did highlight the risk of S4U2Proxy in section 5.1 of MS-SFU:

"The S4U2proxy extension allows a service to obtain a service ticket to a second service on behalf of a user. When combined with S4U2self, this allows the first service to impersonate any user principal while accessing the second service. This gives any service allowed access to the S4U2proxy extension a degree of power similar to that of the KDC itself.

This implies that each of the services allowed to invoke this extension have to be protected nearly as strongly as the KDC and the services are limited to those that the implementer knows to have correct behavior."

- https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/security/threat-protection/security-policy-settings/domain-controller-ldap-server-signing-requirements
- https://support.microsoft.com/en-au/help/4034879/how-to-add-the-ldapenforcechannelbinding-registry-entry
- https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows-server/security/credentials-protection-and-management/protected-users-security-group





kerberos.surge.sh



"There are no stupid questions, so let's also agree there are no stupid answers."